Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
2012

All for One and One for All: Informed Consent and Public Health
Jessica Wilen Berg
Case Western University School of Law, jessica.berg@case.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Repository Citation
Berg, Jessica Wilen, "All for One and One for All: Informed Consent and Public Health" (2012). Faculty
Publications. 14.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

ARTICLE
ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ALL:
INFORMED CONSENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH

ABSTRACT
The concept of informed consent is well established in the
field of bioethics, but its application is unclear in the
area of public health. The increasing prevalence of public
health interventions creates a need to analyze the scope of
government power as it relates to individual choice. This
Article explores three different types of public health measures
in which individual choice has been limited: (1) environmental
interventions; (2) classic public health interventions to prevent
contagious disease; and (3) public health information reporting
or use. The reasons for limiting informed consent vary
depending on the context, and the implications for the scope of
an exception likewise vary. Careful consideration of the
theoretical bases for exceptions indicates the importance of
information disclosure in almost all situations, and may lead
to novel solutions, such as a "fair use" model for health
information. A singular "public health exception" concept is
overly broad and superficial. Instead, there should be a fuller
debate about the requirements of informed consent in the wide
variety of public health settings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Could you be vaccinated against HlNl influenza without
your consent? Do residents of a municipality need to consent to
the chlorination of their drinking water? Should public health
authorities have access to your personal medical information
without your permission?
Informed consent is a bedrock principle of bioethics, but its
application in the context of public health is unclear. In some
descriptions of the doctrine, the category of "public health" is
considered a standard exception to informed consent
requirements. In others, only "public health emergencies" are
exempted, similar to the general emergency exception. 1 Some
reject the blanket exception altogether and insist that cases be
evaluated individually, with public health needs balanced
against individual autonomy. 2 Little theoretical work has been

1.
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 35-36 (1986).

2. See James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare Bemheim, Beyond the Liberal and
Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV.
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done in this area to understand the scope of state public health
powers, and what has been done often applies concepts such as
"social contract" in a relatively superficial manner. 3 Given the
vast expansion of public health interventions in recent decades,
there is a growing call for an analysis of individual choice in this
context. 4
Part I of this Article begins with a brief overview of informed
consent in health care and lays out the standard exceptions. This
section examines why we have informed consent for treatment
and the justifications for allowing exceptions. The standard
exceptions to informed consent for treatment flow from the initial
justification for the doctrine's application. Informed consent is a
means of acknowledging individual autonomy; in situations in
which autonomy is impaired, or autonomy is not promoted by
requiring individual consent, exceptions are appropriate. The
focus is exclusively on adults throughout this Article, and I do
not address either the application of informed consent doctrine to
minors or the range of public health interventions that involve
children. 5 Additionally, discussion is limited to public health
practice and treatment, not research. 6
Parts II through IV explore three general categories of
public health practices: environmental health interventions,
classic public health interventions to combat contagious
disease, and public health information reporting or use. These
sections consider the scope of individual informed consent in
various public health settings. In some cases individual
consent is inapplicable for reasons similar to the standard

1191, 1197 (2003).
3.
See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ
Taking, Racial Profiling & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 88-90 (2001)
(discussing the social contract in the context of presumed consent to public health
measures).
4.
See Roz D. LASKER & THE COMM. ON MED. & PUB. HEALTH, MEDICINE & PUBLIC
HEALTH 9, 20 (1997) (discussing the formation and expansion of government agencies
geared toward addressing "categorical problems" in public health, such as "immunization,
lead toxicity, sexually transmitted diseases, and tuberculosis").
5.
There is an extensive literature on consent and children. See, e.g., Yoram
Unguru, Pediatric Decision-Making: Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Child
Assent, in CLINICAL ETHICS IN PEDIATRICS 1, 2 (Douglas 8. Diekema et al. eds., 2011).
6.
There is some debate about the line between public health treatment and public
health research. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC),
DISTINGUISHING PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH NONRESEARCH 1-2 (July
29, 2010) [hereinafter CDC Guidelines], http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/integrity/docs/cdcpolicy-distinguishing-public-health-research-nonresearch.pdf ("Although some public
health activities can unambiguously be classified as either research or non-research, for
other activities the classification is more difficult."). For my purposes, I will assume that
the interventions discussed here are considered treatment.
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exceptions-i.e., based on the analysis of autonomy. In other
cases the original rationale for requiring informed consent
(promoting autonomy) clearly applies, but there may be
various justifications offered to limit its use in the specific
public health situation. Drawing from political philosophy, 7 I
explore these justifications for limiting individual choice and
identify the implications for the application of informed
consent requirements. Different philosophical theories may
explain why certain public health interventions are allowed
without individual consent or explain why interventions are
allowed in limited circumstances, but none justify a blanket
exception to informed consent for all actions. The goal of this
Article is not to resolve debates about the usefulness of various
theoretical rationales, nor to identify one rationale that
applies in all circumstances. Rather, it is to show that there
are different reasons why individual informed consent may be
avoided in different public health contexts; there is no single
"public health exception."
For each category of public health practice, I consider
whether there needs to be a substitute for, or a modification of,
legal consent requirements. Some important, perhaps even
surprising, points come out of this analysis. First, each rationale
for avoiding individual informed consent has different
implications for the application of the scope of an exception.
Nonetheless, all share one thing in common: while one aspect of
informed consent may be deemed unnecessary (individual
consent or authorization), the other part is still required
(information disclosure). Second, the theoretical rationales for
allowing an exception to informed consent may be different for
different applications of the same public health intervention. For
example, vaccination of health care workers without consent may
be justified using a theory that does not justify nonconsensual
vaccination of the general public. 8 Furthermore, the rationale
itself may provide crucial limitations on the extent of the
exception. If the rationale for allowing the exception is utilitarian
7.
Others have also drawn from political philosophy in evaluating public health,
although not in the way I do here. See, e.g., Childress & Bernheim, supra. note 2, at 1192
("Political philosophy ... provides an important foundation for and sets limits on public
health law. It identifies the normative values that should structure the relationship
between the state and the individual, the legal powers that enable officials ... to address
public health threats, and the processes of reflection, deliberation, and justification that
should direct the exercise of the legal powers." (footnote omitted)); Onora O'Neill,

Informed Consent and Public Health, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS

ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON

1133, 1133 (2004) (''The most basic philosophical difficulties with informed consent arise
because consent is a propositional attitude.").
8.
See infra Part liLA.
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(i.e., public health maximization), it may turn out that a better
public health result is achieved by instituting a voluntary
system, which includes consent, rather than by imposing
mandatory requirements. For example, broader vaccination may
be achieved through a consent-based intervention, even though
an exception would appear to be permissible.
Finally, a shift away from focusing on individual
authorization requirements in various public health contexts
allows us to explore novel approaches to thorny problems. There
is extensive current debate about the sharing and use of an
individual's private medical information and the role of consent
in this context. I suggest a type of "fair use" model of information
sharing, drawing from intellectual property law. 9 The end result
of the work done here will be a better understanding of the scope
of state public health powers and a fuller debate about the
specific requirements for individual informed consent in public
health settings.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
A doctrine judicially created in the late 1960s and early
1970s, informed consent has become a standard part of medical
10
practice. It is an interesting question whether the judicial
doctrine drove the ethical one, or vice versa. Prior to development
of the judicial doctrine, consent played little or no role in
standard medical practice. 11 Unlike, for example, the doctrine of
confidentiality that has a long history in medicine, informed
consent did not show up in ethical codes until late in the
twentieth century. 12 Informed consent for research developed
separately from informed consent for medical practice, and its
current structure is based on federal regulations. 13 Regardless of
its origins, informed consent now forms the bedrock of clinical
bioethics. It is not, however, without its critics. 14 While the
principle of autonomy drives much bioethics discourse, many
commentators have pointed out the need to balance autonomy
against other interests and to incorporate other ethical
approaches besides the principlist one upon which the doctrine of

9.
See infra Part IV (discussing public health information reporting and use).
10.
For more detail, see JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 15, 41, 44-46 (2d ed. 2001).
11.
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 86-87.
12.
Id. at 84-86. A full analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this piece.
13.
BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 249.
14.
See generally id. at 146-61 (focusing on three critiques: autonomy-oriented,
health-oriented, and interactionist).
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informed consent appears to be based. Autonomy is a Western
(and distinctly American) value and may not fit well within other
cultures and practices. 16 Even under a principlist approach to
bioethical issues in medicine, 17 the principle of autonomy may
sometimes be outweighed by the principle of justice, which can
limit the distribution of scarce medical resources regardless of
individual preferences, or by the principle of beneficence, which
may weigh in favor of treatment even over the individual's
objections. 18 But even with these concerns, autonomy remains a
strong concept within bioethics and medicine, and it is most often
actualized through the doctrine of informed consent. 19
Informed consent, while often referred to as a unitary
concept, is really made up of two requirements-a duty to
disclose information and a right to make decisions. 20 To meet the
information requirement, physicians must disclose basic
information about the patient's diagnosis and treatment options
along with their risks, benefits, and alternatives. 21 The patient is
asked to either consent to or refuse the treatment. (In this sense,
"informed choice" may be a better name for the doctrine than
"informed consent" because refusals must also be informed.)22 The
vast literature and extensive case law on informed consent will
not be rehashed here. 23 More relevant for our purposes are the
specific situations in which either or both requirements
(disclosure and consent) are altered or avoided. The established
exceptions include: incompetence, 24 waiver, 25 emergencies, 26
15.
ld. at 32-34; see, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 33
(1998) (recognizing the force of autonomy in bioethics, but arguing that it should be one of
a "bouquet of concepts" that are considered with regards to medical decisions).
16.
BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 14.
17.
A principlist approach identifies a series of core principles that should guide
medical practice. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAiviP & JAiviES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 12-13, 25 (6th ed. 2009). According to the version proposed by
Beauchamp and Childress, the principles include: autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence,
and justice. I d. at 12-1.3. In many applications of the principlist approach, the principle of
autonomy seems paramount. Cara M. Cheyette, Comnwnitarianism and the Ethics of
Communicable Disease: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 678, 682
(2011).
FADEN & BEAUCHAlviP, supra note 1, at 12-18.
18.
Id. at 18-19.
19.
20.
BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 41.
21.
Id. at 54-60.
22.
Id. at 54.
See generally id. at 41-52 (chronicling the development of consent requirements
23.
by the courts).
Jessica Wilen Berg, Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Constructing
24.
Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Malle Medical Decisions, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 346-47 (1996).
25.
Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiuer, 40 Hous. L. REV. 281, 326-29
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therapeutic privilege, 27 and some public health interventionsthe scope ofwhich are the focus of this Article.

A. Justification for the Doctrine of Informed Consent
w-hy require individual informed consent? A number of
28
reasons are offered by consent theorists. First, individuals
are most likely to know their interests and thus make better
choices for their health and well-being. 29 Second, the
information requirement may increase the likelihood that the
intervention will be beneficial because the individual better
understands what to expect, including being prepared to
recognize problems that may arise. 30 Third, even if individuals
err in their choices, we are better off as a society if we
encourage individual decisionmaking and thus develop
autonomous citizens. 31 Fourth, individuals have a right to
control what happens to their bodies. 32
The first three of these rationales are straightforwardly
utilitarian-more utility overall comes from allowing individual
choice, even if in a particular situation one could argue that the
individual is making a poor decision. While overall we may be a
better society if we encourage individual decisionmaking, this
may not be true in all cases. Act-utilitarianism would allow
variations of the rules to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
and it is an unwieldy theory to apply. 33 Rule-utilitarianism seeks
to identify the general rule that would increase utility and is a
more common approach. 34 Here the general rule is thought to
(2003).
26.
BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 76.
27. Id. at 79.
See id. at 18-21 ("The primary goals of informed consent are the protection of
28.
patient or subject welfare and the promotion of autonomy."); see also FADEN &
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 7-16 (including also the principle of justice, but noting that
"[t]he major moral and conceptual problems about informed consent are not justice-based
and do not directly confront issues of social justice").
29.
BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 20, 24.
30.
See id. at 18 (disGussing benefits that derive from informed consent, such as
monitoring of symptoms).
See Berg, Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 24, at 346 (opining that it is preferable to
31.
allow an individual to make his or her own choices even if another person is better able to
make the decision); Charles W. Lidz & Robert Arnold, Rethinking Autonomy in Long Term
Care, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 603, 605 (1993) (discussing the reasons that autonomous
decisionrnaking is superior to outsider decisionrnaking in the health care context).
32.
BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 21.
33.
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 17, at 339-40.
34.
Id.; see also David 0. Brink, Mill's Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1669, 1671 (2010) ("[T]he most common indirect utilitarian theory of duty is rule
utilitarianism.").
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favor individual choice. But even a general rule will have
exceptions, and rule-utilitarianism allows for these when the rule
with the exception would result in more overall utility than the
rule applied without exception. (In essence, the rule is either
defined more narrowly to exclude the exception, or the exception
35
is built into the rule.) Take the example of quarantine-a
situation in which allowing individual choice may result in
significant societal harms. An act-utilitarian would ask, for
example, whether the quarantine of this particular person would
increase overall utility. A rule-utilitarian would ask whether a
rule permitting the quarantine of any person who finds herself in
the particular situation would increase overall utility (regardless
of the utility balance in a particular case). Both approaches
would theoretically allow for quarantine without individual
36
consent, provided the balance of utility worked in its favor.
The final rationale for requiring individual informed consent
is rights based and closely linked to the development of the
37
judicial doctrine. But as with other rights-based justifications, it
does not necessarily provide a sufficient rationale on its own. 38
Where does the right come from? Or to put it another way, why is
there a right to control what happens to one's body? Appeal to a
natural rights framework may solve the problem for some. 39
Individuals have inherent rights over their bodies, and informed
consent simply recognizes those rights. But even if we accept a
natural rights basis, individual rights of bodily integrity are not
absolute, and there will be situations in which harm to the group
may overcome individual authority to control what happens to
oneself. From another perspective, individuals have rights, such
as the right to control what happens to their bodies, because it
increases overall utility (by, for example, encouraging autonomy,
or because individuals are better suited to make decisions about
themselves than others). Thus, rights theory may not stand on its
own in this context; rather, the "rights" that arise are those that

35.
J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART &
BERNARD WILLIAiVIS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 10-11 (1973).
36.
I'll return to this in more detail below when discussing quarantines. See infra
Part III (discussing quarantine as a classic public health intervention).
37.
See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 40-41 (discussing how some
decisions regarding medical treatment are protected by the constitutional right to
privacy).
38.
See BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 21-22 (stating that the right to determine
what happens to one's own body does not by itself justify informed consent).
39.
The source of such natural rights raises other questions. For a full discussion of
a rights-based right to informed consent (albeit in the research context), see generally
CHARLES FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1974).
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serve a utilitarian basis. If the rights are based on utilitarian
reasoning (e.g., according the rights results in a better society
overall than when not doing so), there is always an argument
that in certain contexts the overall utility favors overriding the
right in question.
B. Informed Consent Exceptions
The commonly recognized exceptions to informed consent
flow from the justifications. For the therapeutic exception, if the
provision of information would so impair autonomy-by making
it impossible for the individual to make a decision-then the
detrimental information may be withheld. 40 Incompetent
individuals lack autonomy, so providing them information or
asking them for a decision would not promote autonomy. 41 Waiver
is itself an exercise of autonomy; it constitutes a choice either to
limit disclosure of certain information or not to make a decision
at all. 42 In an emergency, limited time makes the full provision of
information and sometimes decisionmaking impossibleautonomy is not promoted by allowing irreparable harm to occur
due to strict enforcement of consent requirements. 43
What about the public health exception? First, it is worth
spending a moment considering what is meant by "public health"
in this context. There are many definitions of "public health."
According to the Institute of Medicine's (IOM) report The Future
of Public Health, "Public health is what we, as a society, do
collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy[,]" 44 a
definition that seems to include everything from homelessness
prevention to vaccination to primary care to gun control. Others
try to distinguish between individual medical care and

40.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The scope of this
exception is extremely limited, and it is hard to conceive of a situation in which the
information would be so damaging. !d.
41.
There is a range of incapacities, and the determination oflegal incompetence to
make medical decisions may vary according to the situation. For additional discussion on
this point, see Berg, Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 24, at 345-51; and O'Neill, supra
note 7, at 1133, noting that informed consent is not possible for "numerous patients with
various types of incapacity."
42.
Berg, supra note 25, at 326-29, 332. I develop the idea of waiver in great detail
elsewhere and will not repeat it here. See generally id. at 306-14, 319.
43. See BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 76-77 ("If a patient's condition is such that
the time necessary for disclosure and consent would be so great that health or life would
be seriously jeopardized ... , none of the interests promoted by the informed consent
doctrine are served.").
44.
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE
FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988).
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population health care. 45 Still others focus on the authority of the
46
state to use legal coercion. We need not resolve this debate. The
limits of "public health" for purposes of a physician's obligation to
promote the health of the community may be different from our
understanding of "public health" for purposes of an
47
epidemiologist's research agenda. Because we are focused here
on a public health rationale for limiting individual autonomous
decisionmaking, at issue are those public health interventions
which raise questions about the authority of the state to use legal
coerciOn.
In the following sections, I consider some examples of such
public health interventions in order to understand whether
informed consent should play a role. I have divided the
discussion of public health interventions into three general
categories: environmental health activities, classic public
health interventions used to combat contagious diseases, and
use of an individual's medical information for population
health purposes (such as determining population disease
burden). These provide a snapshot of the range of public health
interventions that raise concerns about the use of state power
without individual consent, and each highlights a different
underlying rationale. Environmental health activities are
examples of situations in which the initial justification for
applying the doctrine of informed consent (autonomy) may not
be pertinent. Contagious disease prevention activities provide
examples in which the doctrine would likely apply but there
are strong reasons to limit the requirement of individual
45.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 16 (2d ed. 2008) ("Public
health is organized to provide an aggregate benefit to ... all the people in a given
community .... Public health differs from medicine, which has the individual patient as
its primary focus."); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Autonomy and Coercion in Disease and Health
Promotion, 5 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 83, 85-86 (1984) (noting that personal
autonomy is treated differently in curative medicine, which is for the benefit of individual
patients, than in preventative medicine, which is for the good of the whole population).
For example, Professor Mark Rothstein explores a taxonomy of public health
46.
and divides the approaches into three categories: human rights, population health, and
governmental intervention. Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health,
30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 144, 144-149 (2002), reprinted in PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS 71-76
(Ronald Bayer et al. eds., 2007). Rothstein supports the narrow definition of public health
as legal intervention. Id. at 76. Edmund Pellegrino focuses on the moral use of coercion to
seek the community's overall health, which is a socially desirable end. Pellegrino, supra
note 45, at 86-89.
47. See Rothstein, supra note 46, at 72 (suggesting that "public health" for purposes
of research questions is less complex than the social and political issues that need to be
resolved for medical interventions); CDC Guidelines, supra note 6, at 2-3 ("The purpose of
research is to generate or contribute to generalizable knowledge. The purpose of
nonresearch in public health is to prevent or control disease or injury and improve health,
or to improve a public health program or service.").
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authorization. Finally, use of an individual's medical
information is a mixed category in which the initial
justifications for application of the doctrine and the range
justifications for overriding it should lead to development of
novel approaches. Not only may the discussion below clarify
the scope of the public health exception, it may also be helpful
in identifying what alternative protective measures should be
applied to substitute for the lack of individual informed
consent.

II. ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
Environmental health activities have been around for as long
as civilization and provide a good place to begin a discussion of the
role (or lack thereoD of individual informed consent. "Sanitary
measures and the protection of food and water supplies
characterized virtually all of the early civilizations" and were used
in ancient Egyptian, Greek, and Roman cities. 48 One of the most
common environmental interventions, even today, is the regulation
of water supplies. Few people suggest that individual informed
consent should play a role here or in similar environmental health
activities (such as regulation of air quality). Why not?
First, and most importantly, environmental interventions
are not applied directly to a particular individual, but at the
community level. 49 Public health interventions that are not
applied at the individual level raise fewer autonomy concerns,
weakening the initial rationales for requiring informed consent. 50
It is unclear whether the individual has special expertise for
making community-level decisions, even with the provision of
additional information. Thus, while we might think that each
individual is best able to make the choice whether or not to
undergo surgery, there is less reason to believe that each
individual separately is best able to make the choice whether to

48. JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH 5-6
(1990).
49. When an environmental intervention moves to an individual application model,
there is usually an effort to obtain consent. For example, while most co=unities
fluoridate their water supply directly, some provide fluoride tablets to schoolchildren after
obtaining parental permission. For an example of a parental permission form, see
Fluoride Tablet Permission Form, SARANAC LAKE CENT. SCH., http://saranaclakecs.org/
education/components/docrngr/default. php?sectiondetailid=3897 & Clast visited Sept. 7,
2012).
50. See Spencer A. Hall, Should Public Health Respect Autonomy?, 18 J. MED.
ETHICS 197, 197-99 (1992) (noting that "[t]here is no clear precedent for 'community
autonon1y"').
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set certain clean air or water standards. 51 The result may be that
some corollary of informed consent is necessary at the group
level.
Second, even though there may be individual effects from
environmental public health interventions, there may be
important reasons to limit individual choice. In fact, allowing
such choice may fundamentally undermine the benefits for others
in the society, perhaps resulting in less individual autonomy
overall. The absence of basic environmental health standards can
prevent individuals from exercising even their most fundamental
rights of bodily integrity. For example, someone living in a
community without basic environmental health protections, such
as a clean water supply, may not be able to exercise much
autonomy (or even survive until adulthood). 52
In thinking about these types of community-level decisions,
consider the "tragedy of the commons" described by ecologist
Garrett Hardin. 53 The concept of"the commons" refers to property
or goods \AJhich are 110n-exclt1dable (one indi~lidual ca11not prevent
the use by another individual) and rivalrous (the use by one
person may prevent the use by others). 54 As a result, each
individual may use up vast amounts of the resource, thus
destroying its use for everyone. The so-called "tragedy of the
commons" occurs when the economically rational (over)use by one

t

I
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l

I
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51.
This is not to say that the individual might not vote, as part of a group,
regarding the clean air standard. But it is less clear that we would have to accord each
individual the right to consent to or refuse clean air in the same way we may do so for a
surgery.
52. See, e.g., The Need, WATERAIDAiviERICA, http://www.wateraidamerica.org/
what_we_do/the_need/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (noting that "[c]lean water
is essential for life"). The theoretical rationale underlying such arguments is a
communitarian one. In one basic form, communitarian theory posits that individuals are
fundamentally social beings and that there is no liberty right to take any action that
would undermine the bonds that hold society together because it would undermine society
and thus wreak havoc with individual identity. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Comnwnitarian
Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308, 308-311 (1985) (remarking that
communitarians disagree with the liberal idea that individual rights should be prioritized
over societal rights). Similarly, other non-individualistic theories, such as feminist
theories or theories of care, stress that obligations arise due to the bonds of care and
affection between individuals and that the state should use its power to reinforce and
support those bonds. Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
ETHICAL THEORY 537, 542, 549 (David Copp ed., 2006). Individual choices, which
undermine those bonds (by causing harm to the group as a whole), may be limited.
Liberty under this approach is a positive freedom-individuals may be restricted from
certain actions that would make them less free. Communitarian theory can thus provide a
basis for understanding limitations on individual autonomy, including limitations on
individual informed consent for public health interventions.
53.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy oftlre Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
54.
Jose Apesteguia & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, The Role of Rivalry: Public Goods
Versus Common-Pool Resources, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 646, 64 7 (2006).
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person destroys the good for all. 55 Hardin's example was of
overgrazing cattle on common lands. 56 If all people are allowed to
act according to their own individual interests, the commons will
not survive. 57 Public goods, by contrast, are those that are both
non-excludable (there is no way effectively to prevent someone
from using the good) and non-rivalrous (the use by one person
does not limit the use by another). 58 For public goods, there are
concerns about free riders who will not "pay" for the good in
question. 59 If there are enough free riders, the good may be
negated. 60 National defense is a paradigm example of a public
good, and water and sanitation are paradigm examples of
commons. In both public good and commons cases, society (via
government) has an important role to play in setting parameters
to address the flaws in individual decisionmaking and to
accommodate for group interests. While a model of "community
input and consultation" may be appropriate, assuming it could be
applied in practice, it is less clear what role individual choice
should play. Unlike the traditional medical context, requiring
individual consent in the context of commons and public goods
may result in less overall autonomy because the good will not
continue to be available. 61 As a result, most environmental health
interventions do not use an individual informed consent model.
But even if there is little role for individual consent here, the
information disclosure aspect of the informed consent doctrine
should be maintained. There is nothing in the analysis of
commons or public goods that would support limiting information
disclosure. In fact, the information disclosure remains crucial to
protect autonomy. 62 For example, municipalities routinely supply
information about local water quality and the protective
measures applied to their public water supplies. 63 To the extent
55.
Hardin, supra note 53, at 1244.
56. Id.
57.
See id. ("Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.").
58.
Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons:
Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333,
1373 (2006).
59. ld. at 1370.
60.
See Hardin, supra note 53, at 1244-45 (explaining that everyone is "locked into
a system of 'fouling our own nest,' so long as [they] behave only as independent, rational,
free-enterprisers").
See id. at 1245 (remarking that "the oceans of the world continue to suffer from
61.
the survival of the philosophy of the commons" and warning that "we must soon cease to
treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone").
62.
See GOSTIN, supra note 45, at 411 (reasoning that information is traditionally a
component of informed consent, which is based off of "personal autonomy and selfdetermination").
63.
See, e.g., CITY OF Hous. DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS & ENG'G, CITY OF HOUSTON,
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individual choice is allowed, the individual has the burden to opt
out by taking other measures (e.g., by seeking another water
supply, such as a private well or bottled water), rather than by
restricting the chlorination on a case-by-case basis. Information
disclosure is necessary to exercise such individual choice.
Moreover, while there may be little role for individual
consent, this is a good example of a context in which a group
input may be appropriate. There are a variety of suggestions as
to how to deal with group interests in decisionmaking. One idea,
discussed extensively in the human subjects research literature,
is to engage in a type of "community consultation" in order to
gain community input into the decisionmaking process. 64 The
community consultation process is not a substitute for individual
informed consent; rather, it is a mechanism through which to
involve the community in the development, review, and oversight
of a research trial. 65 The consultation may be achieved through
various means, and there is continuing debate about how best to
achieve community involvement. Suggestions include identifying
community spokespersons or leaders, holding special community
meetings, surveying relevant groups, and implementing public
notification mechanisms. 66 For example, UNAIDS, the United
Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, publishes Good Participatory
Practice Guidelines for HIV prevention trials. These guidelines
lay out a detailed community engagement plan, which includes

DRINKING
WATER
QUALITY
REPORT
2006
1-5,
http://documents. publicworks.houstontx.gov/documents/divisions/utilities/water_quality_r
eport_2006.pdf (informing the public of the sources of drinking water and the quality of
drinking water).
64.
See, e.g., Jessica Berg, Waiver of Informed Consent for Emergency Research, 1 J.
MED. & L. 1, 19, 26-27 (1997) (discussing the community consultation requirement for
emergency research). There are also suggestions to use community consultation for
international research and for U.S. research involving vulnerable populations (such as
genetics research). See, e.g., Charles Weijer & GuyJ. LeBlanc, The Balm of Gilead: Is the
Provision. of Treatment to Those Who Seroconvert in HN Prevention Trials a lV!atter of
Moral Obligation or Moral Negotiation?, 34 J.L. lVIED. & ETHICS 793, 805 (2006)
(describing U.S. and international guidelines for community consultation in research).
65.
See Patricia A. Marshall & Jessica W. Berg, Protecting Communities in
Biomedical Research, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 29 (2006) (noting that "community approval
does not replace the need for individual consent[,]" and discussing various ways that
communities can be consulted throughout the period community research projects are
conducted).
66.
Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498,
51,514-15 (Oct. 2, 1996); CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. AWARDS CONSORTIUM CIVITY.
ENGAGEMENT KEY FUNCTION CO!VIM. TASK FORCE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CIVITY.
ENGAGEMENT, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRINCIPLES OF COIVIMUNITY
ENGAGEMENT 115-16 (2d. ed. 2011) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
ENGAGEMENT]; GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., THE GENETIC TOWN HALL: MAKING EVERY
VorcE COUNT 1-3 (2004); Marshall & Berg, supra note 65, at 29.
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education, capacity building, and community empowerment. 67 In
fact, the concept of community engagement is becoming more
68
prevalent in public health practice generally. The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) stress the need to
"broaden our understanding of the key principles that underlie
successful community engagement in public health."69 The June
2011 second edition of Principles of Community Engagement
provides a review of the concepts and principles, as well as a
detailed plan for engaging communities in public health practice
and research. 70 There are also frameworks for community input
in the area of environmental law, requiring community referenda
before allowing certain types of land development. 71 Another
example comes from the Convention of Biological Diversity,
which requires "[p]rior informed consent" from indigenous
communities for access to genetic resources. 72
All community consultation approaches have similar
limitations, such as difficulties identifying the relevant
"community" (there are often multiple, overlapping communities)
and related problems identifying relevant spokespersons. 73 But
despite these limitations, each approach provides an important
recognition of the group interests at stake. While community
input should not be thought of merely as an extension of
individual informed consent, it can serve a similar roleproviding a check against government intervention in situations

67.
JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), GOOD
PARTICIPATORY PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL HN PREVENTION TRIALS 31-32
(2007), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/unaids/2007/9789291736348_eng.pdf.
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, supra note 66, at xv, 3;
68.
Mary Anne Morgan & Jennifer Lifshay, Community Engagement in Public Health,
CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVS. 2 (2006), http://www.barhii.org/resources/downloads/
community_engagement.pdf (describing Contra Costa Health Services' community
engagement efforts).
CDC/ATSDR COMM. ON CMTY. ENGAGEMENT, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
69.
PREVENTION, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 1 (1997).
70.
See generally PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, supra note 66 (outlining
concepts, principles, and a detailed plan for community engagement).
71.
Brant McGee, The Community Referendum: Participatory Democracy and the
Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent to Development, 27 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 570,
568, 592 (2009); see also Melanie Nakagawa, Comment, Overview of Prior Informed
Consent from an International Perspective, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL 'y 4, 4, 6 (2004)
(raising the issue of who should give consent in multilateral environmental agreements by
explaining examples ofland use conflicts in Chile and Alaska).
72.
Joshua Rosenthal, Politics, Culture, and Governance in the Development of Prior
Informed Consent and Negotiated Agreements with Indigenous Communities, in
BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW 373, 374 (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007); Laurel A. Firestone,
Comment, You Say Yes, I Say No: Defining Community Prior Informed Consent Under the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 171, 176 (2003).
73.
Marshall & Berg, supra note 65, at 29.
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where individual consent is absent." Although many health
departments already take steps to alert communities about
environmental health efforts, more work should be done to
develop mechanisms of gathering and incorporating community
input with respect to the various environmental decisions that
must be made before intervention. In the same way that the
incompetence exception to traditional informed consent does not
relieve physicians of their informed consent obligations, but
simply shifts the disclosure and consent requirements to
surrogate decisionmakers, in the environmental health context
public health officials should be viewed as having corresponding
obligations to inform and consult with affected communities.
Individual informed consent may not play a significant role in
environmental health interventions, but community consultation
should. 75
III. CLASSIC PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS TO COMBAT
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES

Protection of the sanitary environment is one classic
example of public health powers; protection against infectious
disease (quarantine, isolation, and vaccination) is another. 76 I
refer to these as "classic" examples because they (at least
quarantine and isolation) have been around since the Middle
Ages and are often thought of as fundamental public health
powers. 77 Almost all states, foreign and national, have laws
74.
OFFICE OF GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND SPONSORS: EXCEPTION
FROM INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RESEARCH 25-26 (2011),
http://fda.gov/downloads/Regulatoryinformation/Guidances/UCM249673.pdf
(providing
the example of community consultation for emergency situations where individual
informed consent is not available); Marshall & Berg, supra note 65, at 29-30
(distinguishing between individual informed consent and community involvement, and
explaining the confusion that arises when the two forms of protection are aligned).
See McGee, supra note 71, at 571-73 (pointing out that community consultation
75.
can stop projects).
76.
Quarantine is the separation of individuals who may have been exposed to the
infectious agent. Quarantine and Isolation, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). Isolation is the
separation of individuals who are infected. Id. I'll use the terms vaccination and
immunization interchangeably below. Technically immunization is any process by which
you achieve a sufficient immune response. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
910 (30th ed. 2003). Immunization can occur after an initial, naturally occurring,
infection. How Vaccines Worh, NAT'L NETWORK FOR lMIVIUNIZATION INFO.,
http://www.immunizationinfo.org/parents/why-immunize/how-vaccines-work (last visited
Sept. 7, 2012). Vaccination is one mechanism to achieve immunization by the direct
introduction of a weakened or inert pathogen that triggers the body's immune response,
thus protecting against future infection. Id.
77.
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (rejecting the defendant's
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granting explicit powers to public health authorities to
quarantine individuals exposed to dangerous contagious diseases
or isolate those who are infected to prevent further spread. 78
Mandatory vaccination is more controversial, 79 and in most cases
is not imposed as an outright requirement, but rather posed as a
condition for privileges such as public school entry80 or
employment. 81 Even the best known of the U.S. vaccination cases,
the Supreme Court's 1905 decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
involved a vaccination law that could be avoided if the individual
paid a fine of $5, moved from the jurisdiction (the requirement
applied only to residents of Cambridge), or could show some
health reason for exception. 82
The underlying focus of these public health interventions is
on protection of public safety by preventing the spread of disease.
The Jacobson court, for example, stressed that "[u]pon the
principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community
has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease
which threatens the safety of its members."83 But while an
argument can be made in favor of community self-defense
against epidemics, unlike the environmental health interventions
assertion that by imprisoning him for refusing vaccination the state was invading his
liberty because "[t]here are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily
subject for the common good"); DUFFY, supra note 48, at 7-8, 24 (explaining the history of
isolation and quarantine). Vaccination came later, after the development of the smallpox
vaccination by Dr. Edward Jenner in the late 18th century and the subsequent
development of immunization by Louis Pasteur in the late 19th century. GOSTIN, supra
note 45, at 372. Vaccination was preceded by variolation, or the process of direct
introduction to the live pathogen. D.A. HENDERSON, SMALLPOX: THE DEATH OF A DISEASE
44 (2009). This was previously used in the smallpox context, most famously by Lady Mary
Wortley Montegu, the wife of the British Ambassador to Constantinople, in the early
1700s. Id. at 45. She subsequently convinced the royal family to use it. I d. Cotton Mather
advocated the technique around the same time in Boston. Id. Unlike vaccination, which
uses a weakened or inert pathogen, variolation carries the risk that the patient will
become ill with the disease in question and could spread it to others. Id. at 44--45. Even
so, the illness and death rate from variolation was significantly below the rates for
contracting the disease naturally. For example, for smallpox the death rate for variolation
was approximately 2%, while the death rate for the disease in the population was 30%. Id.
at 45.
78.
GOSTIN, supra note 45, at 437.
79. Id. at 376-77.
80.
James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 868-73 (2002).
81. Healthcare workers are required to have a number of vaccinations. See, e.g.,
Vaccines & Immunizations, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www2a.cdc.gov/nip/statevaccapp/statevaccsapp/Administration.asp?statetmp=TX
(last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
82. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12, 38-39. The health exception was read into the statute
by the Supreme Court, which assumed that any vaccination mandate would have such a
limitation. Id.
83. Id. at 27.
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described above, all three-vaccination, quarantine and
isolation-are interventions that are applied at the individual
level. The individual application of the intervention raises the
same concerns about autonomy that justified application of the
informed consent doctrine in the first place. Why not simply
inform individuals and allow individual choice in these contexts?
The problem is that the individual interests in these situations
do not always line up with the community interests. While this
may seem obvious in the case of quarantine and isolation, it is
also true for vaccination, which may provide some benefit to the
individual, but may also be harmful. Geoffrey Rose draws
attention to this problem in his description of the "prevention
paradox," noting that "a (preventive) measure that brings large
benefits to the community offers little to each participating
individual."84 Herd immunity is achieved by vaccinating enough
members of the population to prevent the spread of illnesses. 85
From the perspective of any one individual, the harms of
vaccination may outweigh the benefits, especially if there is
assurance that enough other members of society are vaccinated,
thus achieving herd immunity for the group. 86 These so-called
"free riders"-people who take advantage of the good in question
(herd immunity) without "paying" for the good (by being
immunized themselves)-may undermine the public good
completely. If enough people assume that others will choose to be
vaccinated and thus decide not to get vaccinated themselves, the
end result may be a failure of herd immunity and an increased
disease burden on the population in question. But while the free
rider problem provides a good basis for justifying some
government intervention, it may not be a strong enough
argument for bypassing individual informed consent for
vaccination. Unlike the environmental cases described above,
here the individual is required to take on a direct burden, one
which may have significant implications for individual health.
There is great resistance in U.S. society to overriding individual
autonomy when the issue is one of bodily integrity. 87
Assuming for our purposes that the doctrine of informed
consent applies to the classic contagious disease interventions,
are there rationales justifying an exception in these
circumstances? There are some possibilities alluded to in the

84.
Geoffrey Rose, Strategy of Prevention: Lessons from Cardiovascular Disease, 282
BRIT. lVIED. J. 1847, 1850 (1981) (emphasis omitted).
85.
GOSTIN, supra note 45, at 378.
86. Id.
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Supreme Court's opinion in Jacobson. The Court first appears to
rely on a social contract rationale. Citing the "fundamental
principle of the social compact[,)" the Court stressed that it was
"not prepared to hold that a minority, residing or remaining in
any city or town ... , and enjoying the general protection
afforded by an organized local government, may thus defy the
will of its constituted authorities .... "88 The "contract" here may
be based on the notion of tacit consent-individuals who chose to
remain in the jurisdiction requiring vaccination are thought to
have agreed to the vaccination. In fact, the Jacobson case itself
took pains to stress that the smallpox vaccination requirement
applied only to residents of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and
noted that the "safety of an entire population [cannot be)
subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses to
remain a part of that population." 89 In addition to the tacit
consent idea, the Court stated that the majority of the population
understands vaccination to be an appropriate mechanism to
prevent smallpox, indicating, perhaps, that hypothetical consent
would function in this context. 90 An alternative basis for the
contract appears to be fairness, as the Court refers to the
possibility that a minority should not be allowed to put at risk
the health of the majority. 91 Should we understand these
theoretical social contract arguments to provide a practical basis
for intervening without individual informed consent, or even
against the individual's express wishes?
A. Social Contract

In fact, the most commonly cited rationale for exerc1smg
state power even over individual objection in the public health
context relies on social contract theory, although it is rarely
92
examined in detail. The social contract idea rests on the notion
that by choosing to live in a society we each agree to accept
certain obligations. 93 Although an individual may not have

88. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27, 37.
89.
Id. at 27-28, 38. The Court also noted that Jacobson, "while remaining in the
community, refused to obey the statute ... ."I d. at 39.
90.
I d. at 34-35.
91.
Id. at 37-38.
92. See, e.g., Pellegrino, supra note 45, at 86-88 (discussing the use of the social
contract theory in improving the health of the community).
93.
See id. at 87-88 ("[A]n obligation of a good society [is] to provide some measure
of health for its citizens, and a duty of a good citizen [is] to contribute to the health of
society."); see also JONATHAN WOLFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 42
(rev. 2006) ("[B]y quietly enjoying the protection of the state one is giving it one's tacit
consent."-!.
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consented to a particular intervention at the time of its
application, we can posit her prior consent as part of a social
contract. John Locke noted that the concept of consent is
extremely limited in this context. 94 Express consent is very rare,
although it would most easily justify state power over
individuals-few people expressly consent to live in a society and
to the corresponding state power. 95
1. Tacit Consent. Instead of explicit consent, we might rely
on tacit or implied consent based on the individual's acquiescence
to governmental rule and his acceptance of the benefits of society.
This poses problems. If consent is the basis for justifying the
state's powers, it seems odd that mere tacit acceptance of the
96
social arrangement could bind an individual. Surely more is
needed to justify state power, particularly where the individual
in question, such as Jacobson, is objecting. Hume argues that
mere residence in a jurisdiction is not enough for tacit consent,
because the only way to "dissent" would be to leave the country. 97
Rousseau goes further to emphasize that absent true freedom to
leave at will, which he argues rarely if ever exists, the concept of
98
tacit consent cannot justify state power. Consider the use of
99
HIV asylums in Cuba to isolate infected individuals -one would
be hard pressed to argue that those people who are confined
"consented" to the confinement merely based on their continued
residence in Cuba.

94.
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 291 (1821) (describing the
"perfect member" of society as one who expressly consents, but noting that tacit consent is
more common and complex); see also PETER JOSEPHSON, THE GREAT ART OF GOVERNMENT:
LOCKE'S USE OF CONSENT 1-2 (2002) ("Jolm Locke is lmown as the great modern
proponent of the idea that a government must be established or founded on the consent of
the governed if it is to make any claim to legitimacy.").
95.
See JOSEPHSON, supra note 94, at 148-49 ("Many may be subject to the law;
only a few are full, participatory members.").
96.
There is an extensive debate about the role of express versus tacit consent,
including the role it plays in Locke's philosophy. See id. at 149-56 (discussing critiques of
Locke's tacit consent theory and Locke's deliberate concealment of the distinction between
explicit and tacit consent). Resolving the issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
WOLFF, supra note 93, at 43.
97.
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 110 (Roger D. Masters ed.,
98.
Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762) (asserting that the only context
in which inhabiting a territory is sufficient "to submit oneself to sovereignty'' is a "free
State, because elsewhere an inhabitant can be kept in the country against his will by
family, goods, the lack of a place of refuge, necessity, or violence; and then his sojourn
alone no longer presupposes his consent to the contract or to the violation of the
contract").
99.
Helena Hansen & Nora Groce, Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Quarantine
in Cuba, 290 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2875, 2875 (2003).
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While the tacit consent idea may not suffice to bind an
individual resident, it may well suffice for the mandatory
vaccination of certain groups, although even this is not without
controversy. For example, one might argue that the choice to
enter the medical profession, or perhaps a particular professional
specialty, functions as tacit consent for public health
interventions such as vaccination. The concept of a "social
contract" between professionals and society is based on the idea
that society accords professionals certain benefits, in exchange
for certain obligations. 100 But even if tacit consent (by entering
and remaining in the profession) functions in this context to
create obligations, one must still establish that mandatory
vaccination is one of those obligations. 101 Recently there was great
resistance to efforts to enforce mandatory H1N1 vaccinations of
health care workers in New York state. 102 In part, the resistance
to the mandatory vaccination laws has been on utilitarian
grounds; noncompulsory schemes coupled with education are
better accepted and may result in greater rates of vaccination
among the target population. 103 Mandatory vaccination is also
used for military personnel 104-another context in which tacit
consent may function through the decision to enlist in one of the
armed services. But even if tacit consent justifies mandatory
vaccination, there would be little basis for avoiding information
disclosure, only for avoiding consent. Moreover, there are various
safety and efficacy requirements that must be met before
implementing a mandatory vaccination program m the
"l"t ary. 105
m11

100. Allen E. Buchanan, Is There a Medical Profession in the House?, in CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH, 105, 109, 113-14, (Roy G. Spece, Jr. et
al. eds., 1996).
101. See Olga Anikeeva et al., Requiring Influenza Vaccination for Health Care
Worhers, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 24, 24-26 (2009) (discussing the implications of imposing
a requirement of mandatory influenza vaccinations on health care workers).
102. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Karen Zraick, New Yorh Health Care Worhers Resist
Flu Vaccine Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at A18.
103. Anikeeva et al., supra note 101, at 27.
104. VACCINE HEALTHCARE CTRS. NETWORI\, STRATEGIC PLAN 18 (2010),
http://vhcinfo.org/documents/VHCStratPlanW ebResolution. pdf.
105.
John D. Grabenstein et al., Immunization to Protect the US Armed Forces:
Heritage, Current Practice, and Prospects, 28 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 1, 16-17 (2006). There
has been quite a bit of debate about the use of a mandatory anthrax vaccination in the
military, based on concerns that its safety and efficacy have not been established (nor,
possibly, the extent of the risk of exposure to anthrax). I d. at 14-15. Whether or not the
mandatory anthrax vaccination is appropriate, the lack of information provided to
members of the armed services during the vaccination effort raises additional concerns
because there appears to be no basis for waiving the disclosure requirement, only the
consent requirement.
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2. Hypothetical Consent. If express and tacit consent are
limited, hypothetical consent might be an alternative basis for
grounding the social contract. Here, one would hypothesize that
if an individual actually were given a choice, she would agree to
be bound by the state in certain ways. The actualization of a
hypothetical consent model is more complex than simply
assuming the individual would agree to a particular law or state
intervention. Such an assumption could not itself be binding. 106
Hobbes would argue that the hypothetical consent arises out of a
determination that certain societal constraints are necessary for
societal functioning and are mutually beneficial. 107 But the
Hobbesian model would allow significant constraints on
individuals, including the imposition of slavery, due to power
differentials. 108 Hobbes's theory of moral justification does not
seem to line up well with our current societal understanding of
justice.
In contrast, Immanuel Kant develops the concept of a
hypothetical social contract, drawing in large part from Rousseau,
starting from a position of equality. 109 He identifies the fundamental
"contract" upon which everyone would agree-the so-called
"categorical imperative"-to always act so as to have that action be
universal law. 110 Developing this idea in more detail, Jolm Rawls
provides a way to implement the categorical imperative by positing
a situation of equality where all individuals are in the "original
position," behind a "veil of ignorance," which blinds them to their
specific situations of religion, health, class, wealth, or talent. 111
Rawls offers three principles that everyone would agree to in the
"original position": the Liberty Principle (everyone has an equal
right to extensive individual liberty); the Fair Opportunity Principle
(if inequalities exist via positions of power or authority, those
positions should be open to all); and the Difference Principle

106.
Will Kymlicka, The Social Contract Tradition, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 186,
187-88 (Peter Singer ed., 1993) ("(A] hypothetical promise is no promise at all, for no-one
has undertaken an obligation.").
107. Id. at 188-90. In some ways this starts to so1.md like communitarian
approaches, which allow for limitations of individual autonomy based on the need for
constraints that are necessary to keep the society functioning. See Gutmann, supra note
52, at 308.
108.
Kymlicka, supra note 106, at 187-88.
109.
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13-14 (Lara
Denis ed., Broadview Press 2005) (1785); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 252-53
(photo. reprint 2005) (1971).
110.
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 29-30 (James
W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g 3d ed. 1993) (1785).
111.
RAWLS, supra note 109, at 136-37.

2012]

'
t
'f

<j

~

t

•

<I

(inequali1
benefit of
But
distribut
not argu(
just thai
While th'
a just so
determin
against
societal '
would h~
public h(
could de
interven1
consent 1
consent<
argue th
agreed 1:
(althougl
the socia
discussio
limiting
does not
the abse
public hE
3.

relying c
H. L. A
IS not v
consente
unfair to
burdens.
literatur

112.
Id
113.
Id
114.
Id
115.
SE
Collide: ThE
452-53 (19~
116.
H
(1955).
Id
117.

2012]

I

1'
i

ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ALL

23

(inequalities should only exist to the extent they are to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged). 112
But while Rawls's theory provides a way to understand the
distribution of property and resources within a society, he does
not argue that anyone actually does consent to these principlesjust that they would under his theoretical original position.
While this is a useful thought experiment to identify principles of
a just society, even Rawls acknowledges that it is not a tool to
determine a priori rights. 113 Rather, it functions as a standard
against which we might determine the justness of current
114
societal distributions. It is difficult to show that individuals
would hypothetically consent to any and all exercises of state
public health power that the authorities deem appropriate. We
could do the same thought experiment with many medical
interventions-showing that individuals would hypothetically
consent to their application-and yet we still require individual
consent at the point of actual intervention. 115 Here too, we might
argue that even if the general concept of vaccination would be
agreed upon, the individual must agree to a specific vaccine
(although there may be consequences for refusal). So although
the social contract based upon prior consent idea is prevalent in
discussions of public health authority, as a theoretical basis for
limiting informed consent it has a number of flaws. It certainly
does not alone justify the imposition of public health measures in
the absence of individual informed consent in all situations of
public health needs.
3. Contract Based on Fairness. A possible alternative to
relying on consent as a basis for the social contract draws from
H. L. A. Hart's theory of fairness. 116 According to Hart, the issue
is not whether each individual has tacitly or hypothetically
consented to be governed; rather, the issue is whether it would be
unfair to accept the benefits of society without also accepting its
burdens. 117 This, too, is a prevalent concept in public health
literature. Individuals gain much from living in society, but

112. !d. at 60-62, 65, 75, 78.
113. !d. at 438.
114. Id. at 12-15.
115. See Catherine E. Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to Rot"
Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Hous. L. REV. 447,
452-53 (1990) (describing the informed consent requirement in medical procedures).
116.
H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 178, 190-91
(1955).
117. Id. at 185-86, 191.
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society cannot function without limiting individual freedom. 118
The social contract is based on the fairness of balancing the
benefits to the individual from the state and the limits that are
119
necessary to maintain those benefits. There are at least two
problems, however, with the idea of fairness. 120 The first is that
there may be some individuals who do not benefit from living in
121
society, and they appear to not be bound under this theory. The
second problem is identified by Nozick, who takes issue with the
whole idea that any unsolicited benefits provided by society could
ever create enforceable obligations for the individual, based on an
idea of fairness. 122 Although in some ways the fairness rationale
is stronger than the consent rationale for a social contract, it is
still hard to understand why fairness alone would justify the
imposition of the full range of public health interventions against
an individual's wishes. In some cases, such imposition may be
patently unfair, no matter what societal benefits are available in
exchange. Alternatively, one might posit a situation in which the
individual in question has not yet obtained benefits but is still
required to accept certain burdens-consider a potential emigre
who has not yet been granted residency but is stopped at the
border before entering a country and required to submit to
123
various vaccinations before their case is even considered.
Despite these limitations, fairness may function as a useful basis
for understanding social contract obligations for certain groups or
certain individuals.
4. Summary of Social Contract Justification. While the
social contract is most often cited for justifying state power, its
philosophical roots are fairly complicated. Express consent

118. See George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, 97
ETHICS 353, 355, .358 (1987) (discussing individuals' obligations to society).
119. See id. at 354-55, 358 (explaining the balance between individuals' benefits and
burdens).
120. WOLFF, supra note 93, at 60-65 (examining problems with the perceived innate
fairness in a democratic system).
121. See K.losko, supra note 118, at 356 ("The fact that individuals widely believe
that they are obligated to bear burdens ... because of considerations rooted in the
principle of faimess does not itself mean that they have these obligations."); see also
Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 Hous. L.
REV. 635, 665 (2000) (explaining that some individuals do not benefit from living in
society).
122.
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 93-94 (1974).
123. The United States has certain immunization requirements for immigrants. See,
e.g., Notice of Reuised Vaccination Criteria for U.S. Immigration, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealthllawsregs/vaccination-immigrationlrevised-vaccination-criteria-immigration.html (last visited
Sept. 7, 2012) (listing vaccination criteria for U.S. immigration).

2(
CE

T
al
Cl
rE

H

CC

a]
S1
H

n
gl

pt
lY

u

tl
p·
cc
tl

B

fi
lf

u

lV
w

Cr

ot

2012]

ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ALL

25

certainly justifies state power, but it is almost never present.
Tacit and hypothetical consent pose certain problems,
although each may provide a good justificatory basis in specific
circumstances. Surely residence alone (tacit consent) cannot
explain why an individual must comply with all public health
restrictions, particularly those that entail individual risk.
Hypothetical consent may provide a better explanation; many
people may agree in the "original position" that appropriate
public health restrictions should be put in place limiting
individual choice. But in some sense this just begs the
question: what constitutes appropriate restrictions? It is not
clear that in the original position people would simply agree to
be governed by whatever restrictions are thought to be
appropriate by the relevant public health authorities; perhaps
they would only agree to certain types of restrictions. Nor does
fairness solve the problem, since for some the fairness of the
benefits justifying the "contract" may be in question. Thus,
Hart's fairness theory may justify obligations for some people,
but not others, and probably does not create a binding social
contract justifying all public health interventions. As
appealing as a social contract justification may be on the
surface, it does not seem to function as a basis for overriding
individual choice in the full range of public health
interventions. A. John Simmons concludes that there must be
grounds other than consent theory for justifying overall state
power, 124 let alone for limiting informed consent. This does not
mean that social contract theory does not have a role to play in
understanding state public health power; it merely means that if
the goal is to develop a framework to analyze the scope of state
public health power in the absence of individual informed
consent, we must seek guidance from other philosophical
theories.

B. Utilitarianism
Perhaps the problem is with the idea of a "contract" in the
first place; a stronger argument in favor of state public health
intervention, even without individual informed consent, may be a
utilitarian one. As the Jacobson court acknowledged, the
Massachusetts "state legislature proceeded upon the theory
which recognized vaccination as at least an effective if not the

124.
See A. John Simmons, Political Obligations and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF
CONSENT 305, 325 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (discussing
objections to consent theory).
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best known way in which to meet and suppress the evils of a
smallpox epidemic that imperiled an entire population." 125 In
other words, despite its flaws, a system of vaccination provides
better overall benefit to the community than a system risking a
smallpox epidemic. The court also noted the very small risk to
individuals (and the possibility that an individual with a real
medical risk could opt out). 126
Utilitarianism offers an additional theory of state public
health power. Moreover, it enables us to weigh the level of threat
(or potential harm) to the community against the level of
127
potential harm to the individual. Jeremy Bentham argues that
individuals have a duty to obey the state when it is in the group's
interest (or when it maximizes the common good-to put it in
standard utilitarian terms). 128 Of course there are many
difficulties with utilitarian theories. Not only is it often difficult
to identify the specific course of action that maximizes overall
utility, 129 but utilitarian reasoning naturally favors the will of the
maioritv. even when it entails e:reat detriment to a minoritv. as
long a~ . the overall utility is~ increased. 130 On its face, this
approach seerns to allow state persecution of minorities in favor
of the common good. vVhile potentially attractive in some public
health contexts, a theory that potentially would allow, for
example, the killing of small number of infected individuals to
v

125.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905).
126.
I d. at 24, 39.
127.
See JOHN STUART MILL, UI'lLI'I'ARIANISiVI 16-17 (George Sher ed., 1979) (defining
utilitarianism principles, which require individuals to "sacrific[e] their own greatest good
for the good of others").
128.
WOLFF, supra note 93, at 50-51. Consequentialist theories, such as
utilitarianism, determine the ethical or correct course of action by looking at the
consequences of different alternatives. The alternative that leads to the best result,
however defined (e.g., most happiness, greatest good, etc.), is the correct one. See David 0.
Brink, Some Forms & Limits of' Consequentialism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL
THEORY, supra note 52, at 381-84. In contrast, natural rights theory-or Kantian
theory-is not consequence driven, but deontological. Robert M. Veatch, Revisiting A
Theory of Medical Ethics: Main Themes and Anticipated Changes, in THE STORY OF
BIOETHICS 67, 81 (Jennifer K. Walter & Eran P. Klein eds., 2003) Deontological theories
evaluate alternative courses of action based on the importance of particular values,
without regard to the consequences of promoting those values. See David MeN a ugh ton &
Piers Rawling, Deontology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY, supra note
52, at 424-26.
129.
See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in SMART & WILLIAlVIS,
supra note 35, at 86-87 ("(I]t is perfectly possible for an agent to be ignorant or
mistaken ... about what is the right action in the circmnstances."). One can apply
utilitarian reasoning without adopting utilitarian theory-i.e., applying a
consequentialist analysis focused on something other than maximal utility-which might
avoid some of the pitfalls with utility calculations.
130. See id. at 105 ("(E]ven if the removal would be unpleasant for the minority, a
utilitarian calculation might well end up favouring this step .... ").
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protect the community as a whole-as is done with animal herds
to avoid the spread of disease 131-should make us wary. On the
other hand, utilitarian theory does not rely on express, tacit, or
hypothetical consent and thus provides an independent basis for
understanding the scope of state power and individual
obligations. 132 Furthermore, utilitarian theory is already a part of
legal reasoning in public health cases, although it may not
always be labeled as such. 133 Thus, the theory may seem
comfortably familiar, even when applied to new cases. More
importantly, because utilitarian theory is already used as a
justification for limiting individual informed consent in a public
health context, we should recognize this more clearly and be alert
to its flaws (such as the difficulty making utility comparisons). In
those cases where the flaws are prevalent, the justification for
limiting informed consent is weakened.
We can draw from the work of John Stuart Mill in applying
utilitarian theory to understand the appropriate scope of state
public health interventions. 134 In On Liberty, Mill suggests a way
to limit state powers under a utilitarian framework using the
principle of liberty. 135 He states, famously, that "the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
136
warrant." This is commonly known as the ''harm principle."137
Individuals should be left to their own devices within the private
sphere because they are more likely to know what will increase
their utility than others (even if they make mistakes) and
because liberty is necessary for the full development of human

131. See 9 C.F.R § 71.14 (2012) (noting that compensation can be made "[w]hen, in
order to prevent the spread of any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease, it
becomes necessary to slaughter any diseased or exposed animals ... ").
132.
Cf MILL, supra note 127, at 6-26 (defining utilitarianism and discussing
utilitarian principles without mentioning consent principles).
133. See Robert I. Field & Arthur L. Caplan, A Proposed Ethical Framework for
Vaccine Mandates: Competing Values and the Case of HPV, 18 KENNEDY lNST. ETHICS J.
111, 114-15 (2008) (discussing utilitarianism in the public health context).
134. See generally MILL, supra note 127, at 7 (introducing utilitarian principles as
those that promote happiness).
135. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 16-17 (Alan
Ryan ed., Penguin Books 2006) (1859); see also ANDREW LEVINE, ENGAGING POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS 143-48 (2002) (discussing Mill's application of
utilitarianism to the principle of liberty).
136.
MILL, su.pra note 135, at 16. Of course we often debate the validity of state and
federal laws which appear to be focused on protecting an individual from harming
himself. Some of these may be justified via a social contract analysis, others may be
invalid exercises of state power.
137. DAVID INGRAM, LAW: lillY CONCEPTS IN PHILOSOPHY 134 (2006).
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beings (and thus the society is better off overall if people are left
to make their own choices). 138 In fact, these two ideas mirror
nicely the oft-cited reasons for requiring individual informed
consent-that individuals are better able to determine which
medical treatments are in their interests, and that promoting
individual choice benefits society by encouraging individual
139
autonomy. State limits on individual liberty are warranted,
then, on two grounds. First, intervention is permitted for those
individuals who lack the capacity to determine their own good,
such as children or incompetent adults. 140 Second, intervention is
permitted in the public sphere on utilitarian grounds-i.e., to
prevent harm to others. Correspondingly, individual informed
consent may not be required in situations where the individual in
question is incompetent, or the intervention is necessary to
prevent harm to others. It is important to stress, however, that
the assertion that state force is not warranted on paternalistic
grounds does not mean that we must stand aside and let
individuals make what are perceived as poor choices. To the
contrary, society may take a variety of measures to encourage
choices that it perceives to be in the interests of its members.
Thus, we may have a third category in which intervention is
permissible on paternalistic grounds, as long as it does not, in the
end, remove the individual's ability to choose. 141 That is, society
may structure decisions in such a way as to encourage the
.!'
d ch mce.
. 142
pre1erre

138.
This is a form of rule-utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarianism seeks to effectuate
rules that will generally result in the greatest good. Act-utilitarianism, on the other hand,
focuses on individual acts and in each case evaluates what action will lead to the greatest
good. These are also sometimes described as direct (act) and indirect (rule) utilitarianism.
See David 0. Brink, Mill's Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1671 (2010).
139.
See supra Part LA
140.
See Field & Caplan, supra note 133, at 111, 114, 118-19 (discussing the
"categories of individuals," including children and disabled adults, who have often been
subject to interventions).
141.
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4-6 (2008) (discussing "libertarian
paternalism," which argues for "self-conscious efforts ... to steer people's choices in
directions that will improve their lives," while "maintain[ing] or increas[ing] freedom of
choice.").
142.
One very interesting approach in this context is the idea of "nudges" described
by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their book. Id. at 3-6. See also the articles and
commentary discussing the ethics of nudges in volume 12, issue 2, of the American
Journal of Bioethics (Special Issue) (February 2012). Creating incentives to influence
choice may be permissible even with respect to fundamental interests of bodily integrity.
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (finding that a state may, through differential
funding, make "childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's
decision" to have an abortion).
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To implement this theory, one needs a basis for
distinguishing the public sphere (where intervention is allowed)
from the private sphere (where it is not). This could be where a
theory of natural rights comes into play-states may not
interfere with the .inherent rights of human beings. 143 If you
accept that natural rights exist, this limitation may solve many
problems. But the mere assertion of natural rights may not
convince everyone of their existence, and it certainly does not
suffice to determine what rights fall into this "natural"
category. 144 In response, Jonathan Wolff argues we can draw from
the concept of utility to delineate the public from the private
sphere. 145 Those laws that promote general utility are within the
public sphere and those that do not are within the private
146
sphere. Of course this may seem like circular reasoning. But
the idea is that rather than try to distinguish public from private
on other grounds (say by determining the inherent or natural
rights of individuals), we should just ask whether the
intervention in question promotes general utility. While debates
remain about the integration of the liberty principle and
utilitarian theory, these are beyond the scope of this Article. For
our purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that this approach
allows us to understand the scope of state powers in the public
health context without relying on the limited notion of a social
contract based either on fairness or consent.

C. Application of Justifications to Contagious Disease
Interventions
In summary, for a utilitarian rationale to justify vaccination
in the absence of informed consent, there must be some showing
that the common good is indeed increased more than the
aggregate of individual harms which may occur by allowing
vaccination without consent. For this latter evaluation, there is
both the harm of intervening without consent (a harm to
autonomy, or a dignitary harm) and the potential physical harms
from the vaccination. 147 Unless the disease in question is a
143.
WOLFF, supra note 93, at 114-15.
144. See id. at 115-16 (discussing the difficulties of defending a "theory of natural
rights" and the difficulties of determining "what natural rights we have"). Consider the
ongoing debate in this country about whether the right to basic health care services is a
"natural right" of human beings.
145. Id. at 116-20.
146.
See id. (describing "the line between the private and public spheres").
147.
See Michelle M. Mello, Rationalizing Vaccine Injury Compensation, 22
BIOETHICS 32, 37 (2008) ("But, arguably, the burdens associated with vaccination
requirements are special: they go beyond dignitary harms and economic losses to actual
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serious threat to the community and unless the vaccine's safety
and efficacy is well established, it may be difficult to justify
jettisoning informed consent requirements. Moreover, even in
those cases where this can be shown, allowing individual
informed consent may still result in more overall utility than a
mandatory system. This may be because the vast majority of
people will accede to a voluntary system, and such a system will
avoid the harm to individual autonomy. In fact, most vaccination
efforts are voluntary, and almost all involve an opt-out for health
148
(and sometimes other) reasons. Even for those that are not
voluntary, there is little basis for allowing an exception to the
information disclosure requirement because the provision of
information will allow individuals to determine the actual risks
to themselves and may result in better overall compliance. Only
the individual consent requirement may be excused, and that
t ances. 149. rare c1rcums
.
onl y 1n
Quarantine and isolation raise similar issues. But unlike
vaccination, there can be little direct therapeutic benefit to
complying. (An individual who has been vaccinated, on the other
hand, may well obtain additional immunity and thus direct
therapeutic benefit.) 150 In fact, there may be considerable risk for
those who are not infected but are quarantined with those who
are. This is one reason why there is increasing interest in using
techniques such as "quarantine in place," in which individuals
151
observe distancing measures within their own homes. For any
one individual, the choice to remain separated from others may
not increase individual utility, but the separation of exposed or
diseased individuals from the group benefits society as a whole. 152
.)

physical injury .... ").
148.
Even school vaccination requirements allow parental opt-outs based upon
health, religious, or sometimes philosophical objections. See School and Childcare
Vaccination
Surveys,
CENTERS
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://www2a.cdc.gov/nip/schoolsurv/schimmRqmt.asp (last updated July 21, 2011)
(providing a state-by-state list of permitted vaccination exemptions).
149. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 712-13 (2003) (In the context of the rabies vaccine,
which has severe side effects, "[c]onsiderations of fairness and justice control only when
individual consent is impossible to obtain").
150. There may be indirect benefits for the individual who avoids infecting friends or
family members. Such benefits may encourage voluntary quarantines.
151. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Quarantine: Voluntary or Not?, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 83, 84 (2004) ("Reframing the stigmatizing term
'quarantine' along the lines of a 'snow day' or 'shelter in place' principles may aid in
acceptance. A snow day is simply a request to limit interpersonal contacts ... by asking
citizens to stay home for a specified period of time.").
152.
GOSTIN, supra note 45, at 12; see Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of
Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1735, 1741 (1988) (noting that quarantine laws are tolerated
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Perhaps individuals, not knowing exposure, would agree,
hypothetically, to such constraints ahead of time. In other cases,
the scope of the quarantined area may be large enough that the
intervention is considered more akin to an environmental one
than one of individual application. In still other cases, a
utilitarian rationale justifies the quarantine, as the potential
harm to the individual is outweighed by the benefits to the
society as a whole. Under this rationale, quarantine and isolation
should be used only rarely, when the benefits clearly outweigh
the burdens. As with vaccination, utilitarian reasoning would
require that if voluntary restrictions are more likely to achieve
the sought-after results than mandatory restrictions, the former
should be used. 153
The classic public-health-interventions-to-combat-infectiousdisease category provides an example in which autonomy does
play a role. But this is also a situation in which exceptions may
function based on a variety of theoretical justifications. Each
justification may apply differently to different groups, such as
health care workers versus the general public, resulting in
diverse applications of informed consent requirements. But no
theory justifies the avoidance of information disclosure
requirements. Even the extremely controversial mandatory
anthrax vaccination of armed forces personnel during the Gulf
War was supposed to include distribution of information
pamphlets at the time of intervention. (Unfortunately, these
were sometimes not available and other times not provided-/ 54 It
is worth recognizing that the traditional emergency exception to
informed consent may also play a role in this context, possibly
limiting expansive disclosure. But most situations calling for
vaccination are not so time-sensitive as to prevent information
disclosure. 155 Paradoxically, the "emergency" necessitating
quarantine or isolation is not directed at the individual whose

because they are of positive utility, that is, "quarantines enhance the general welfare").
153. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Your Liberty or Your Life: Talking Point on Public
Health Versus Civil Liberties, 8 EMBO REP. 1093, 1096-97 (2007) (comparing the
effectiveness of mandatory versus voluntary quarantine).
154.
Bernard Rostker, Information Paper: Vaccine Use During the Gulf War,
GULFLINK, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/va/ (updated Dec. 7, 2000); see also MILITARY
VACCINE AGENCY, DEP'T OF DEF., ANTHRAX VACCINE IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM
INFORMATION (Dec. 19, 2005), http://wwv:.vaccines.mil/documents/864Dec2005houseinhouse-out.pdf (providing information on the Department of Defense's Anthrax Vaccine
Immunization Program as of 2005).
155. See Recommended Immunizations for Adults, CENTERS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (last updated May 31, 2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/
schedules/downloads/adult/adult-schedule-easy-read. pdf (recommending immunizations
windows that extend to four years or even longer).
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liberty is restrained, but involves the risk of exposure of others.
This is a fundamentally different situation than the typical
emergency exception which justifies avoidance of requirements
based on the promotion of the individual's own autonomy, which
may be lost (through extensive harm to health or life) by
insisting on fully informed consent in an emergency. 156
So although there is a public health exception to informed
consent for classic contagious disease interventions, the
exception only excuses the consent requirement (if even that), not
the information disclosure obligations. The focus of those
disclosures, however, may well be different than the traditional
informed consent context. Professor Wendy Parmet suggests that
we shift the scope of disclosure away from individual risks and
benefits and towards the public health risks and benefits of any
particular intervention. 157 For example, disclosure in the vaccine
context would include the public benefit of vaccines and the
harms of failing to achieve herd immunity. 158 Moreover, the
obligation to disclose information would shift from the private
clinical encounter to a public setting, and also from a professional
liability model to a public accountability model for inadequate or
unpublicized warnings. 159 Thus, informed consent for public
health interventions may look substantially different than
informed consent for individual medical treatment interventions.
IV. PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATION REPORTING Al'W USE

Perhaps even more interesting than the traditional public
health examples discussed thus far is the growing use of personal
medical information for public health purposes. 160 The most

156.
Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.lVI. L.
REV. 39, 70-71 (2007) (discussing "preservation of life or the prevention of serious bodily
harm to the patient" as the primary justification for the traditional emergency exception
to informed consent); Jolm A. Gleason, Quarantine: An Unreasonable Solution to the
AIDS Dilemma, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 217, 234 (1986) ("It must be realized that quarantines
are instituted in order to benefit the public, not the individual.").
157.
WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 198-203
(2009).
158.
See Wendy E. Parmet, Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They
Compatible when it Comes to Vaccines?, 8 J. HEALTH CAREL. & POL'Y 71, 107-10 (2005)
(advocating for disclosing the public benefits and harms of vaccinations as opposed to just
the individual benefits and harms).
159.
Id.
160.
There is also the use of personal health information for research purposes.
While I acknowledge that the line between public health practice and research is not
always clear, discussion of the limitations of informed consent for public health research
is a topic for another article.
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common use is contagious disease reporting. 161 In addition to
disease reporting, there are also efforts to gather information to
determine population disease burden, or even to target
interventions to persons at risk. Consider one New York City
Health Department program that sends letters to diabetes
patients who have glycemic control issues, like a high AlC test
level, or who are overdue for a test. 162 Although the actual testing
is done with patient consent, the monitoring and notification
letters are sent whether or not the patient has consented to the
intervention. 163
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the information in
question should be within the control of the individual, 164 why
and when is it permissible to use such information without
consent? The usual justifications for requiring informed consent
to treatment do not necessarily apply to sharing of information.
That is not to say that consent may be avoided in all situations,
just that the reasons for requiring consent here are not the same
as the reasons for requiring consent to treatment. Confidentiality
of medical information serves two primary purposes-it
recognizes individuals' rights to control their identity and it
encourages the free sharing of information with medical
professionals. 165 The first rationale is rights-based and the second
utilitarian: better health outcomes will be achieved if individuals
share information with medical professionals, and the
assumption is that they will not do that unless the information is
kept confidential. But health outcomes may be better overall if
some information (i.e., that related to contagious diseases) is
shared in a limited way. Additionally, there is no evidence that
mandated disclosure of some personal information (even
identifiable information) results in patients being less willing to
161. See Terence L. Chorba et a!., Mandatory Reporting of Infectious Diseases by
Clinicians, 262 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 3018, 3018-19 (1989) (noting that all states have some
form of mandatory communicable disease reporting).
162.
N.Y.C. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, THE NEW YORK CITY A1C REGISTRY:
SUPPORTING PROVIDERS & PATIENTS IN DIABETES CARE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dohl
downloads/pdf/diabetes/diabetes-a1c-reg-serv.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
163. See N.Y.C. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, NEW YORK CITY A1C REGISTRY:
IMPROVING DIABETES CARE IN NEW YORK CITY 25 (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdfldiabetes/diabetes-a1c-reg.pdf (explaining that
patients are automatically enrolled in the registry and must specifically opt-out of the
A1C registry if they do not wish to be contacted).
164.
In other words, assuming the information in question is, in fact, the individual's
information as opposed to information regarding a family or group. See, e.g., Jessica Berg,
Grave Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 81, 90-95 (2001) (discussing control over an individual's confidential information
after his or her death).
165.
PARMET, supra note 157, at 82-84, 97-98.
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share information with health care professionals. 166 Debates
about this lack of empirical evidence have come up in other
contexts, such as the effect of mandatory reporting laws on
individuals' willingness to seek medical care. 167
Even if the doctrine of informed consent applies to the use of
individual medical information generally, various theoretical
rationales may justifY an exception for sharing some information.
First, sharing information without individual identifiers raises few,
if any, autonomy issues, bringing up questions about the
justification for applying the doctrine in the first place. 168 The notion
that individuals should have absolute rights to control information
they generate is belied by the consistent narrowing of private
169
space.
While control over identifiable information may have
implications for individual identity (and thus for autonomy), control
over de-identified information is less easily justified using an
autonomy model. 170 At the very least, even if there are autonomy
interests in controlling de-identified information, these interests
should be balanced against other principles and other rights.
Consider, for example, the use of infonnation to detennine
population level disease burden, such as state-mandated cancer
registries. In most cases the reporting is anonymous-the
information is shared, but stripped of identifYing characteristics.
Here there is no rights-based justification for individual control over
identity because the information is not linked to identity. Moreover,
because the issue is anonymous information sharing, not individual
intervention, the other autonomy-based rationales do not apply. 171
Yet infonning the individual about the disclosure remains

166.
Berg, supra note 164, at 107.
167.
See, e.g., Nichole Miras Mordini, A1andatoTy State Interventions for Domestic
Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects of Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L.
REV. 295, 326 (2004) (describing the policy arguments used in support of and in opposition
to mandatory reporting statutes). A large number of states have mandatory reporting for
gunshot wounds. For a list of statutes, see Family Violence Statutes, AM. ACAD.
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, http://www.aaos.org/about/abuse/ststatut.asp (last visited Sept.
7, 2012).
168.
There is a vast amount of literature discussing identifiability of information,
and I will not go into detail here.
169.
See Jonathon W. Penney, Privacy and the New Virtualism, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH.
194, 205-10 (2008) (discussing the challenges to "informational privacy'' in the digital
age).
170.
See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451,
519-21 (1995) (discussing a spectrum of the identifiability of information and the
corresponding protections the information should receive, with anonymous information
receiving the least protection).
171. Id. at 520 (recognizing that "patients have a weaker claim to control the use of
nonidentifiable data because they are less likely to suffer personal harm by the
disclosure").

2012]

ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ALL

35

important. It allows individuals to prepare for a possible breach of
confidentiality, and may enable them to take steps to minimize the
harmful impact.
Second, even if identifiable information is shared, and thus
autonomy clearly an issue, one of the rationales allowing an
exception to informed consent requirements may apply. Sharing
identifiable personal medical information raises autonomy
issues, but not in exactly the same way as mandatory medical
interventions because bodily integrity is not at issue. Consider
contagious disease reporting. All states have mandatory
reporting statutes for various diseases. 172 Contagious disease
reporting generally is not anonymous. 173 The practice of contact
tracing requires individually identifiable information to be
shared with public health authorities so other exposed
individuals can be notified. 174 This does not mean that the initial
infected individual has to be identified to the contacts, but the
public health authority has access to identifiable information. As
a practical matter, patients may be asked to provide informed
consent before disclosure, but such authorization is not always
required. 175 Social contract and fairness rationales may function
to allow some information sharing. We currently live in a society
that requires a great deal of information sharing to function
well. 176 Moreover, a general rule allowing the sharing of such
information may result in more overall utility than a rule
allowing it to remain confidential; this is often the cited basis for
confidentiality exceptions. 177
The information sharing context is one in which the initial
autonomy rationale does not function in the same way as it
might when bodily integrity is at issue, and also one in which
various theoretical justifications may function to allow an

172. Chorba et aL, supra note 161, at 3018.
173.
See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., The Role of State Law in Protecting Human Subjects
of Public Health Research and Practice, J.L. MED. & ETIDCS 654 (2003) (noting that many
states do not require informed consent "for the release of identifiable information for
public health purposes").
174. Nancy E. Kass & Andrea Carlson Gielen, The Ethics of Contact Tracing
Programs and Their Implications for Women, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 89, 90-91
(1998).
Burris et al., supra note 173, at 656.
175.
176. See Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in the Federal Bankruptcy
Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1011, 1024-25 (2000) ("[S]ociety needs
information to function; therefore, any action which chills the willingness of persons to
provide information hurts society.").
177.
See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings
Under California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 314-15 (1996) (discussing
several utilitarian rationales for and benefits of information disclosure).
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exception. Even if informed consent is applied in the
traditional sense, it may not function to provide adequate
protections from harm. Gathering public health information is
crucial-what alternatives to the informed consent model
might be used? One interesting approach may be to apply a
framework analogous to the "fair use" exception in copyright
law. 178 The doctrine allows third parties to use an individual's
intellectual property in a reasonable manner, even in the
absence of consent. 179 Thus, even if individual medical
information is viewed as the property of the individual (and
this is still a point to be determined)/ 80 there could be various
uses of the information allowed without individual informed
consent. Some of the debates about the copyright fair use
exception have taken issue with the idea that it can be
"predicated on the implied or tacit consent of the author,"
181
noting that such consent is fictional at best. Similar to the
debates discussed earlier about tacit consent, an alternative
rationale for justifying fair use, such as utilitarianism, may
need to be explored.
Despite these barriers, developing a doctrine of
information "fair use" may be a valuable mechanism that could
be applied to allow the public health use of information
without individual informed consent. The copyright fair use
exception is delineated in § 107 of Title 17 of the U.S. Code. 182
There are four factors to consider:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work [purely factual versus creative
work]; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a

170. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW§§ 10.01-.05, at
487-89 (5th ed. 2010) (describing the "fair use" doctrine). The application of the exception
rests on four factors: noncommercial use, factual versus creative copyrighted work,
amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect on the potential market for
the protected work. Id. § 10.06, at 493-94; see also Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d
Cir. 2006) (discussing the distinctions between creative and factual work in the fair use
context). These factors could be adapted to medical information use.
LEAFFER, Sttpra note 178, § 10.02, at 487-88.
179.
180. The well-known Moore v. Regents ofthe University of California case involved a
question of a research use of information. 793 P.2d 479, 480-82 (Cal. 1990). Although the
court rejected the idea of a property right in information, it did state that informed
consent was required. Id. at 484--85, 487-89, 492-93.
181.
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 13.05, at 13157 (2012).
182.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 183
What would a public health fair use exception for
individual health information look like? First, consider how
the information is being used and by whom. Information used
for public health purposes, particularly if gathered by
government entities, such as public health departments (or
upon direct authorization from a public health department),
would be more likely to fall into the exception than, say,
information gathered by health care institutions or pharmacies
for marketing purposes. 184 Second, information "created" by the
individual-for example, notes about patient feelings or
patient statements-may be given more protection than more
purely "factual" information about medical status, such as
contagious disease diagnosis .185 Third, the scope of use is
relevant; information disclosed should not include the entirety
of the individual's medical record. Only that information
necessary to achieve the public health goal in question should
be shared. The fourth factor takes into account the potential
market for the information. There is a growing interest in the
potential value of personal data, and recent efforts (such as the
Facebook IP0) 186 reflect the possibility that a clear market will
emerge in this context. While there are already markets for
third party aggregations of data, there is little financial gain
to be had by individuals choosing to share their own
187
information. Changes in this area may result in limitations
on fair use.
In addition to efforts to scope out the full contours of a fair
use analog, future scholarly efforts should continue to
scrutinize the role of autonomy, rather than just assume its
application, and consider whether individual informed consent
should (or even could) play a protective role in various
settings. Work must also be done to develop better disclosure
mechanisms and more secure information safeguards rather

183. ld.;
see
also
Fair
Use,
U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html (last updated June 2012).
184. See Harper & Roe Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985) (noting
that commercial as opposed to nonprofit use is a "factor tending to weigh against a finding
of fair use").
185. Mental health information may be given more protection under this conception.
186.
Somini Sengupta & Evelyn M. Rusli, Personal Data's Value? Facebook Set to
Find Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at A1.
187. See ,Joshua Brustein, Start-Ups Seeh to Help Users Put a Price on Their
Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at B3 (discussing the value of personal data,
and opining that "individually, [personal] bits of data are worth practically nothing").
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than relying on individual authorization as a means to protect
individual interests. Moreover, while consent may not always
be required for the sharing of public health information, as
with the other exceptions, disclosure obligations still exist.
Parmet's suggestions may be applicable here, too, indicating
the need to shift the focus from the individual to the public
•
188
settmg.
Finally, the scope of permissible use of individual medical
information in the research context must be examined. The
growing trend in medical research is to use observational
studies, drawing on existing data in medical records. 189 The
line between such efforts and public health surveillance and
monitoring is less clear than the line between traditional
clinical trials and public health. 190 There is a type of fair use
exception in patent law, allowing the use of patented
inventions without prior licensing for experimental purposes. 191
Like the scope of copyright fair use, the scope of the
experimental use exception is subject to debate. Both,
however, seem to be premised on the idea that even protected
intellectual property can be used without permission or
compensation, provided the use is not directly commercial. 192
Although this Article does not directly address research uses of
information, it may be that an experimental use exemption
provides a valuable framework for understanding the limits of
individual informed consent for research involving medical
information.

188.
Parmet, supra note 158, at 107-10.
189.
SeeP. Jepsen et al., Interpretation of Obseruational Studies, 90 HEART 956, 956,
960 (2004) (noting that observational studies are frequently the only feasible way to
research modern medical questions). There are other research studies for which requiring
individual informed consent will also cause problems. See, e.g., Julius Sim & Angus
Dawson, Informed Consent and Cluster-Randomized Trials, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 480,
481-82 (2012) (discussing incompatibility of informed consent with some clusterrandomized trials).
190. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Priuacy, Autonomy,
and Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 97-104,
109 (2012) (comparing clinical and observational research, discussing the benefits and
risks of observational research, and discussing whether informed consent should be
obtained in observational research).
191.
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 315-16 (2003). There is both a common-law experimental
use exception and a statutory exception. 35 U.S.C. § 27l(e)(1) (2011); Madey v. Duke
Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
192. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (making commercial versus educational use a
primary factor in evaluating fair use); Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (strictly defining patent
experimental use defense to exclude any activity that has commercial implications).
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V. CONCLUSION

There is no single theory that explains the scope (and
limits) of state public health powers and the corresponding
obligations of individuals to submit to state authority in a
public health context. There are multiple bases for justifying
state power to intervene without individuq.l consent, and each
has slightly different implications. As a result, there are
varying degrees to which individual informed consent
requirements apply in public health contexts. Some
individuals may have expressly consented to certain
limitations; others may be bound by fairness. 193 It is worth
pointing out, however, that even if some people can claim that
they are exempt from direct obligation to society to accept
public health interventions, that does not mean they are free
to do anything. The absence of political obligations (say to the
state or community in general) does not presuppose the
absence of moral obligations (such as the obligation not to
harm others). 194 We may well have moral obligations to our
communities to accept certain public health interventions such
as quarantine, isolation, or vaccination. But this is further
than we need go in delving into political theory. For purposes
of this Article, we need only consider the role the justifications
play in understanding the contours of a public health
exception to informed consent.
While the prior discussion does not identify one single
justification for allowing a public health exception to individual
informed consent, it does provide some clear guidance in this
area. First, no rationale examined appears to justify the
avoidance of disclosure obligations, except when the traditional
emergency or waiver exceptions apply. That is, while some public
health interventions may be allowed without individual
authorization, in all cases information should be shared either
directly with the individual or through general public
notification. Second, the framework governing information
disclosure may need to shift from an individual model to a public
health model. This may necessitate changes both in the content
of the disclosures (e.g., inclusion of public health risks and
benefits) and the location of the disclosures (e.g., moving from the
individual clinical setting to the community level). Third, the use

193.
See WOLFF, supra note 93, at 55-56 (discussing the principle of fairness in the
context of consent).
194. Id. at 37-38 (discussing how political and moral obligations operate
independently).
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of a particular rationale to justify an intervention may only work
in certain contexts, and it is worth taking the time to evaluate
each fully. A social contract model may be applicable to certain
groups (e.g., health care professionals), but not to others (e.g., the
general public). Moreover, application of a rationale that initially
appears to permit an exception, such as maximizing overall
health, may, in fact, weigh in favor of individual consent when
the use of a consent model will increase participation and thus
195
overall health. Fourth, where an exception to informed consent
does come into play, effort should be made to consider what other
protections may need to be implemented. Community
consultation should play a larger role than it currently does in
designing, implementing, and evaluating public health
interventions. Finally, although autonomy remains a valued
principle in our society and the doctrine of informed consent
serves to protect and promote autonomy, development of
alternative frameworks, such as "fair use" of personal health
information, will be crucial to maintain an appropriate balance
between public health needs and individual rights.

195. The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services recently convened a
working group to study which policies, including mandatory requirements for influenza
vaccination of health care workers, will best achieve target vaccination rates.
HHS Action Plan to Prevent Healthcare·Associated Infections: Influenza Vaccination of
Healthcare Personnel, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & Hli!vL SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/
ash/initiatives/hailtier2_flu.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).

